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Cooperative Control via Congestion Game
Approach
Yaqi Hao, Sisi Pan, Yupeng Qiao, and Daizhan Cheng, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—The optimization of facility-based systems is con-
sidered. First, the congestion game is converted into a matrix
form, so that the matrix approach is applicable. Then, a facility-
based system with a system performance criterion is considered.
A necessary and sufficient condition is given to assure that
the system is convertible into a congestion game with the
given system performance criterion as its potential function by
designing proper facility-cost functions. Using this technology, for
a dynamic facility-based system the global optimization may be
reached when each agent optimizes its payoff functions. Finally,
the approach is extended to those systems which are partly or
nearly convertible.
Index Terms—Congestion game, potential function, facility-
based system, distributed welfare, Nash equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
The distributed resource allocation problem, such as dis-
tributed welfare [9], cost sharing [1], [6], etc., aims at optimal
resource distribution. This problem has been formulated as a
congestion game, which is a special class of potential games
[12], [10]. Precisely speaking, by designing proper utility
functions to each agent, the overall welfare (or overall cost)
is considered as the potential function. Then, the techniques
developed for game theoretic control (GTC) are applicable
to find pure Nash equilibriums, which provide candidates of
optimal solutions [7], [8].
In a distributed resource allocation problem, the overall
welfare is separable, if it can be written as
W =
∑
r∈R
Wr, (1)
where {Wr} is the set of separated welfare functions. In
recent works this separability is assumed. For instance, as
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described in [9], distributed welfare game is a tuple G =
{N,R, {Ai}, {Wr}, {fr}}, where {Wr}, the welfare function
for resource r, is known and the overall welfare W =
∑
r∈R
Wr
is determined.
In this note we consider a facility-based system as G =
{N,R, {Ai}, P}, where P = W is a global performance
criterion, which could be considered as overall welfare/cost,
etc. The main problem concerned here is: can we convert
this facility-based system to a congestion game? That is,
can we design the facility-cost functions Ξr, such that the
corresponding welfare functions Pr = Wr for facility r
satisfy (1)? Briefly speaking, we want to know whether W
is separable? If “yes”, the GTC techniques developed in [9],
[1], [6], etc., can be used for facility-based systems.
In resorting to semi-tensor product (STP) of matrices, the
problem is investigated by expressing a congestion game
into its matrix form. Then, the separability problem becomes
solving a set of linear equations. The main contribution of this
note consists of two parts: (1) Check whether the objective
function is separable. If “yes”, the design of cost functions is
proposed. (2) If “no”, the nearest separable potential game is
considered, which enlarges the applicable set of the previous
design method to facility-based games.
The STP of matrices is a generalization of conventional
matrix product and all the computational properties of con-
ventional matrix product remain available. Throughout this
note, the default matrix product is STP, so the product of
two arbitrary matrices is well defined and the symbol ⋉ is
mostly omitted. A brief survey on STP and related notations
are provided in Appendix.
The rest of this note is organized as follows: Section 2
proposes a matrix form description for a congestion game.
Section 3 provides a necessary and sufficient condition for
the separability. In Section 4, the congestion game approach
is extended to cases where facilities are either restricted or
inconsistent.
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II. MATRIX EXPRESSION OF CONGESTION GAMES
A congestion game is a tuple G =(
N,M, (Ai)i∈N , (Ξj)j∈M
)
, where N is the set of players;
M is the finite set of facilities to be shared by players; the
facility-cost function Ξj : R → R describes the cost of
facility j ∈ M , which depends on the number of players
using the facility j in a profile a; Ai ⊂ 2M is the strategy
(action) set of player i and each strategy (action) in Ai is a
subset of M , which means that player i has the option of
selecting multiple facilities [10].
Denote the set of profiles as A =
∏n
i=1 A
i. For a profile
a = (a1, · · · , an) ∈ A the number of users of facility j is
denoted as
rj(a) :=
∣∣{i ∣∣ j ∈ ai}∣∣ , j = 1, · · · ,m. (2)
Define the payoff function of player i, i.e., ci : A→ R by
ci(a) :=
∑
j∈ai
Ξj(rj(a)), i = 1, · · · , n, (3)
and a function P : A→ R as
P (a) :=
∑
j∈∪n
i=1
ai
rj(a)∑
ℓ=1
Ξj(ℓ)
 . (4)
Using (3) and (4), we have the following result:
Theorem 2.1: [10] A congestion game is a potential game
with payoff functions in (3) and the potential function in (4).
In the following, we will express (3) and (4) into matrix
forms.
Assume
N = {1, 2, · · · , n}; M = {1, 2, · · · ,m}.
To begin with, we consider the facility-cost functions Ξj .
Denote
Ξj(k) := ξ
j
k, k = 1, · · · , n; j = 1, · · · ,m,
where k is the number of players using facility j ∈M. Then,
Ξj can be expressed in a vector form as
Ξj =
[
ξj1, ξ
j
2, · · · , ξ
j
n
]
, j = 1, · · · ,m.
Putting all facility-cost functions together, we have
Ξ := [Ξ1,Ξ2, · · · ,Ξm] ∈ R
mn. (5)
Next, we express each strategy (action) ai ∈ Ai into a vector
form. Since ai ∈ 2M , we use an index vector to express it.
Let ai ∈ Rm be a column vector with entries as
ai(s) :=
1, s ∈ ai;0, otherwise. (6)
Using (2), we construct
r(a) := [r1(a), · · · , rm(a)]
T.
It can be verified that
r(a) =
n∑
i=1
ai, a ∈ A. (7)
Define
di(a) =
δ
ri(a)
n , ri(a) 6= 0;
0n, otherwise.
Using them, we construct
D(a) := diag (d1(a), d2(a), · · · , dm(a)) . (8)
A straightforward computation shows the following result:
Proposition 2.2: The payoff functions ci can be expressed
as
ci(a) = ΞD(a)a
i, i = 1, · · · , n. (9)
Finally, we construct a set of Boolean vectors as
bi(a) := [1, · · · , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
ri(a)
, 0, · · · , 0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−ri(a)
, i = 1, 2, · · · ,m,
and define
B(a) := [b1(a), b2(a), · · · , bm(a)] . (10)
Then, we can prove the following result.
Proposition 2.3: The potential function can be expressed as
P (a) = ΞBT(a), a ∈ A. (11)
III. OPTIMIZATION VIA DESIGNED FACILITY COSTS
A. Design of Facility-Cost Functions
First, we give a rigorous description for a facility-based
system (FBS):
Definition 3.1:
1) An FBS is a tuple Σ = (N,M, (Ai)i∈N , P ). Here,
N = {1, 2, · · · , n} is the set of players and M =
{1, 2, · · · ,m} is the set of facilities shared by players.
Each player is capable of selecting potentially multiple
facilities in M ; therefore, we say that player i has
strategy (or action) set Ai ⊂ 2M , that is, the set of
certain subsets of M . P : A→ R is the system overall
cost, which needs to be minimized.
2) A :=
∏n
i=1 A
i is called the set of profiles of the system.
Our purpose is to find a profile a∗ ∈ A, such that
P (a∗) = min
a∈A
P (a). (12)
The fundamental idea of the technique developed in this
paper is: choosing suitable facility-cost functions (FCFs) such
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that the FBS can be converted into a congestion game with
a pre-assigned performance criterion P (a) as its potential
function. Then, we use properties of the potential game to
realize the optimization. Therefore, the key issue is: can we
find a suitable set of FCFs such that the given P (a) becomes
its potential function? To answer this question, we construct
a linear system as follows:
Assume |A| = ℓ (that is, there are ℓ different profiles) and
denote A = {S1, S2, · · · , Sℓ}. A linear system is defined as
BΞT = P, (13)
where
B =

B(S1)
B(S2)
...
B(Sℓ)
 , P =

P (S1)
P (S2)
...
P (Sℓ)
 ,
and B(a) is defined in (10).
The following result answers the above question.
Theorem 3.2: Consider an FBS. A set of FCFs can be found
such that the FBS becomes a congestion game with P (a) as its
potential function, if and only if, (13) has at least one solution.
Proof: The necessity comes from the matrix expression
of a congestion game. Precisely speaking, collecting (11)
for all a ∈ A together yields (13). As for the sufficiency,
using the solution of (13), i.e., the Ξ, it is easy to construct
the corresponding FCFs. Then a straightforward computation
shows that the corresponding potential function is exactly the
given P (a).
Remark 3.3: Using (13), we have
P (a) = ΞBT(a)
= Ξ1B
T
1 (a) + · · ·+ ΞmB
T
m(a)
=
(
r1(a)∑
j=1
Ξ1j
)
+ · · ·+
(
rm(a)∑
j=1
Ξmj
)
=
∑
i∈M
Pi(#(a)i),
where
Pi(#(a)i) =
ri(a)∑
j=1
Ξij
is the separated cost for facility i, i = 1, · · · ,m.
One can easily see that
Ξik := ci(k) = Pi(k)− Pi(k − 1).
Hence, (13) implies a standard distributed cost structure [7].*
*This is pointed out by an anonymous reviewer.
B. Dynamics of Facility-Based Systems
Definition 3.4: An FBS is called a dynamic FBS, if the
system (or game) is repeated and the strategy profile is updated
in a Markov-style as:
x1(t+ 1) = f1(x1(t), x2(t), · · · , xn(t))
x2(t+ 1) = f2(x1(t), x2(t), · · · , xn(t))
...
xn(t+ 1) = fn(x1(t), x2(t), · · · , xn(t)).
(14)
The dynamic equation (14) is determined by the strategy up-
dating rules (SURs). There are several commonly used SURs.
We refer to [5], [11] for more SURs and the constructing
process of building the dynamic model using SURs. Only
one SUR, called the Myopic Best Response Arrangement
(MBRA), is used in this paper. We briefly describe it as
follows: Consider a game with N = {1, 2, · · · , s} and player
i has its strategies as Ai = {1, · · · , ki}. Assume at time t the
other players use their strategies as a−i ∈
∏
j 6=iA
j , and the
player i is allowed to update his strategy at the next moment
t+ 1, then he will choose
xi(t+ 1) ∈ argminℓ∈Ai
(
ci(ℓ, a
−i)
)
. (15)
MBRA is widely used because it has the following nice
property.
Theorem 3.5: [10] Consider a finite potential game.
1) It has at least one pure Nash equilibrium.
2) If at each moment only one player is allowed to update
his strategy and MBRA is used, then the dynamic
potential game will converge to its Nash equilibrium.
Remark 3.6:
1) Assume (13) has solution. The profile a∗, such that (12)
holds, is a Nash equilibrium.
2) It is worth noting that in general a congestion game may
have more than one Nash equilibriums. As long as the
Nash equilibrium is unique, MBRA-based dynamics will
converge to this unique Nash equilibrium, which is also
the minimum point of P (a).
IV. DESIGN FOR RESTRICTED FBSS
A. Partly Designable Facilities
This subsection considers the case when only part of
facility-cost functions can be designed. This situation happens,
for instance, the rest facilities are owned by other companies
or so, and hence you can only design the facility-cost functions
of your own facilities.
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Based on the attribution of design right, the finite set of
facilities M can be divided into two disjoint sets as follows:
M = Ω ∪ Ω∁,
such that for each facility j, its facility-cost function can be
designed, if and only if, j ∈ Ω∁.
Now set Ω = {i1, i2, · · · , it} ⊆ M. According to this
partition in M , similarly, we divide Ξ, B(a) and P (a)
respectively as
Ξ˜ := [Ξ1, · · · ,Ξi1−1,Ξi1+1, · · · ,Ξit−1,
Ξit+1, · · · ,Ξm],
Ξˆ := [Ξi1 ,Ξi2 , · · · ,Ξit ],
B˜(a) := [b1(a), · · · , bi1−1(a), bi1+1(a), · · · ,
bit−1(a), bit+1(a), · · · , bm(a)],
Bˆ(a) := [bi1(a), bi2(a), · · · , bit(a)],
P˜ (a) := P (a)− Bˆ(a)ΞˆT.
From above definitions, one can easily see that Ξ˜, B˜(a)
and P˜ (a) are only related to facilities in Ω∁. Using above
denotations, a linear system is defined as
B˜Ξ˜T = P˜ , (16)
where
B˜ =

B˜(S1)
B˜(S2)
...
B˜(Sℓ)
 , P˜ =

P˜ (S1)
P˜ (S2)
...
P˜ (Sℓ)
 .
The following result is an immediate consequence of The-
orem 3.2.
Corollary 4.1: Consider an FBS with a given performance
criterion P (a). If only part of facility-cost functions can
be designed, a set of FCFs can be found such that the
FBS becomes a congestion game with P (a) as its potential
function, if and only if, (16) has at least one solution.
B. Restricted Facilities
This subsection considers the case when some facilities
are restricted because of, for instance, their ultimate bearing
capacity. Hence, you can only consider desirable profiles.
Assume a set of constraints are given as
k11r1(a) + k12r2(a) + · · ·+ k1mrm(a) < T1
k21r1(a) + k22r2(a) + · · ·+ k2mrm(a) < T2
...
kt1r1(a) + kt2r2(a) + · · ·+ ktmrm(a) < Tt.
(17)
We say, for a profile a, it is a desirable one, if and only if,
it satisfies (17). Otherwise, it is undesirable.
Hence, according to (17), we can verify that the set of
profiles A contains two disjoint parts expressed as
A = Ω ∪ Ωc,
where Ω is the set of desirable profiles while Ωc is the set of
undesirable ones.
In order to assure the Nash equilibrium a∗ ∈ Ω, we further
define payoff functions c˜i(a) and performance criterion P˜ (a)
respectively as follows:
c˜i(a) :=
ci(a), a ∈ Ω;c∗, a ∈ Ωc, (18)
where c∗ ≫ max
i=1,2,··· ,n
{ci(a)|a ∈ Ω};
P˜ (a) :=
P (a), a ∈ Ω;P ∗, a ∈ Ωc, (19)
where P ∗ ≫ max{P (a)|a ∈ Ω}.
From the definition of Ω and (19), the following result can
be obtained.
Proposition 4.2: The minimization of performance criterion
P (a) is equivalent to that of P˜ (a). That is,
P (a∗) = mina∈A P (a) ⇔ P (a
∗) = mina∈Ω P (a)
⇔ P˜ (a∗) = mina∈A P˜ (a).
A linear system is defined as
BΞT = P, (20)
where
B =

B(Sl1)
B(Sl2)
...
B(Slk)
 , P =

P (Sl1)
P (Sl2)
...
P (Slk)
 , {Sl1 , · · · , Slk} = Ω.
According to Proposition 4.2 and Theorem 3.2, we have the
following result.
Corollary 4.3: Consider an FBS with a given performance
criterion P (a). If facilities are restricted as (17), a set of FCFs
can be found such that the FBS becomes a congestion game
with P (a) as its potential function, if and only if, (20) has at
least one solution.
C. FBS with Improper P
Consider an FBS G with given Ξ and P . Assume for this
given P (13) has no solution. For this case, the dynamical
equivalence is applied to investigate its convergence to Nash
equilibriums.
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Definition 4.4: [4] Two evolutionary games are said to be
dynamically equivalent, if they have the same strategy profile
dynamics (that is, fi, i = 1, 2, · · · , n, defined in (14)).
First, we give the process of constructing an FBS G′s
closest congestion game G0.
Let B0 be the matrix consisting of maximum linear inde-
pendent columns of B defined in (13). Hence, B0 has full
column rank.
From (13) one sees easily that the subspace of congestion
games, denoted by V p, is spanned by the columns of B0. That
is,
V p = Span{Col(B0)}. (21)
For an FBS G with given P (a), it is clear that the least square
solution for (13) is
ΞT0 = (B
T
0 B0)
−1BT0 P. (22)
Using this Ξ0, the corresponding potential function P0 can be
calculated via (13). Then, we have the following definition.
Definition 4.5: For an FBS G with given P , the game G0
is said to be its closest congestion game, if the facility-cost
functions and potential function are Ξ0 and P0 mentioned
above.
According to Definition 4.4, the following proposition is
straightforward verifiable.
Proposition 4.6: If an FBS G with given P and Ξ is
dynamically equivalent to its closest congestion gameG0, then
it can be led to a pure Nash equilibrium.
Assume there exists ǫ ≥ 0, such that
‖P − P0‖ := max
a∈A
|P (a)− P0(a)| < ǫ. (23)
The following result can be obtained.
Proposition 4.7: Assume (23) and MBRA is used to gen-
erate the dynamics of G by using Ξ and Ξ0 respectively. If
these two dynamics are dynamically equivalent, then G with Ξ
will converge to a Nash equilibrium. If the Nash equilibrium,
denoted by a∗, is unique, it is a near smallest point, that is,
|P (a∗)− Pmin| < 2ǫ.
Example 4.8:
Given an FBS with N = {1, 2, 3}, M = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5},
A1 = {a11, a
1
2},
A2 = {a21, a
2
2, a
2
3},
A3 = {a31, a
3
2, a
3
3},
where a11 = {1, 2, 3}, a
1
2 = {3, 4, 5}, a
2
1 = {1, 2, 4}, a
2
2 =
{3, 5}, a23 = {4, 5}, a
3
1 = {1, 3, 4}, a
3
2 = {2, 5}, a
3
3 =
{3, 5}.
Denote the set of profiles (in alphabetic order) as
{S1, S2, · · · , S18} = {a
1
1a
2
1a
3
1, a
1
1a
2
1a
3
2, · · · , a
1
2a
2
3a
3
3}. Using
(7), we have
r(S1) = [3, 2, 2, 2, 0]
T ,
r(S2) = [2, 3, 1, 1, 1]
T ,
...
r(S18) = [0, 0, 2, 2, 3]
T .
It follows from (10) that
B(S1) = [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0].
Similarly, B(Si), i = 2, 3, · · · , 18, can also be calculated.
Then the coefficient matrix B for (13) is obtained as
B =

1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1

.
1) Assume the system performance criterion P (a) is given
in Table I.
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE CRITERION P (a):
a 111 112 113 121 122 123 131 132 133
P (a) 33 27 24 26 23 25 25 22 20
a 211 212 213 221 222 223 231 232 233
P (a) 28 28 26 33 13 20 29 16 19
It is easy to verify that (13) has solutions. For instance,
one of the solutions is
Ξ = [11, 2, 4, 0, 5, 6, 0, 3, 7, 2, 6, 3, 1, 3, 4]. (24)
According to Theorem 3.2, under the facility-cost func-
tions determined by (24), the system becomes a con-
gestion game with pre-assigned P (a) as its potential
function.
2) Assume the system performance criterion P (a) and
facility-cost functions Ξ are given as
P = [29, 25, 24, 28, 12, 18, 25, 24, 19, 27, 29, 24, 32, 19,
27, 25, 23, 22]T ,
Ξ = [0.5, 0, 0.5, 1.5, 5, 2, 5, 0.5, 10, 11, 5, 3, 0, 0.5, 0].
It is easy to verify that for the given P (13) has
no solution. Hence, we consider its closest congestion
game.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL, VOL. XX, NO. Y, MONTH 201Z 6
First, we can easily obtain B0 from B by deleting the
last three columns of B as
B0 =

1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0

.
Using (22), we have
Ξ0 =[0.4704, 0.1516, 0.0004, 1.5766, 4.6840, 1.1375,
5.7214, 0.1263, 9.5267, 11.2585, 5.0109, 2.5485,
0, 0, 0],
and through (13), the corresponding potential function
P0 can be calculated as
P0 = [29, 25, 23.9887, 28.8315, 12.5786, 17.4214,
24.3156, 23.7109, 19.1532, 26.8641, 28.7218,
24.1641, 32.1142, 18.6828, 26.6329, 25.1359,
23.5674, 22.1170]T.
Next, we can calculate the payoff functions of G by
using Ξ and Ξ0 respectively, which are shown in Table
II and Table III (roundoff to 0.01).
Using the MBRA, we can get the best responding
strategies respectively. It is obvious that they have the
same strategy updating dynamics f1, f2 and f3, which
are shown in Table IV.
According to Definition 4.4, we know that these two
dynamics are dynamically equivalent. Hence, the FBS
with given Ξ and P has at least one Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, for the FBS G with Ξ, we have a switched
system as
x(t+ 1) = Lσx(t), (25)
where σ ∈ {1, 2, 3},
L1 = δ18[10, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 17, 9, 10, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 17, 9],
L2 = δ18[7, 5, 6, 7, 5, 6, 7, 5, 6, 16, 14, 18, 16, 14, 18, 16,
14, 18],
L3 = δ18[3, 3, 3, 5, 5, 5, 9, 9, 9, 12, 12, 12, 14, 14, 14, 18,
18, 18].
Now, we assume the probability P (σ = i) = 1/3, i =
1, 2, 3, and three initial profiles are randomly chosen for
a Matlab simulation. The results are shown in Fig.1.
From Fig.1, one sees that the strategy profile dynamics,
starting from any initial profile, will converge to the
unique Nash equivibrium δ518 ∼ {1, 2, 2}.
Finally, we assume ǫ = 0.9. It is easy to calculate that
‖P − P0‖ := max
a∈A
|P (a)− P0(a)| = 0.8315 < ǫ.
(26)
According to Proposition 4.7, we know that the Nash
equilibrium δ518 ∼ {1, 2, 2} is a near smallest point, that
is,
|P (a∗)− Pmin| < 2ǫ.
In fact, it can be verified that for this example we have
|P (a∗)− Pmin| = 0.
TABLE II
PAYOFF MATRIC OF G WITH Ξ:
c\a 111 112 113 121 122 123 131 132 133
c1 6 7 5.5 11.5 6 12 2 10.5 2.5
c2 10.5 13 16 10 1 10.5 5 11.5 11.5
c3 6 2 0.5 21 5.5 10.5 5.5 5.5 1
c\a 211 212 213 221 222 223 231 232 233
c1 3.5 10.5 6 15.5 11.5 21 4 10 5.5
c2 4.5 10.5 7 10.5 0.5 10 3.5 5 5
c3 3.5 5.5 1 15.5 1.5 10 4 1.5 0.5
TABLE III
PAYOFF MATRIC OF G WITH Ξ0 :
c\a 111 112 113 121 122 123 131 132 133
c1 4.81 7.01 4.96 11.25 5.28 11.57 1.85 10.88 2.17
c2 9.70 12.55 16.09 9.53 0.13 9.53 5.01 11.26 11.26
c3 5.14 1.14 0.13 20.94 4.68 9.53 5.29 4.68 0.13
c\a 211 212 213 221 222 223 231 232 233
c1 2.67 10.73 5.14 14.54 11.38 20.79 2.67 10.73 5.14
c2 4.28 10.17 7.06 9.53 0.13 9.53 2.55 5.01 5.01
c3 2.83 4.68 0.13 15.01 1.58 9.53 3.15 1.58 0.13
TABLE IV
STRATEGY UPDATING DYNAMICS:
f\a 111 112 113 121 122 123 131 132 133
f1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
f2 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 2
f3 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3
f\a 211 212 213 221 222 223 231 232 233
f1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
f2 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 3
f3 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28
t
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
x
(t)
 process of strategy updating dynamics
Fig. 1. Profile Dynamics of (25)
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V. CONCLUSION
This note investigates the cooperative control of a facility-
based system via congestion game approach. First, a matrix
form description of a congestion game is presented. Then, a
necessary and sufficient condition is obtained to assure the
separability of the pre-assigned performance criterion P (a).
That is, the FBS can be converted into a congestion game with
P (a) as its potential function. Using properties of potential
games, the convergence to a Nash equilibrium is obtained.
Thirdly, the result has been extended to some incomplete cases
where P (a) is not separable. Particularly, the problem of near
dynamic congestion game is considered. It is proved that under
dynamic equivalence the near congestion games may also be
led to a Nash equilibrium.
Our approach can only be used for classical congestion
games, where the user with multiple unit demands is not
allowed. For instance, in the transportation congestion model
a route segment can not be used by a player for more than
once. But the user with multiple unit demands is an interesting
and challenging problem. It could be studied in the future.
VI. APPENDIX
This appendix gives a brief survey for semi-tensor product
of matrices. We refer to [2], [3] for more details.
For technical statement ease, we first introduce some nota-
tions: (1)Mm×n: the set ofm×n real matrices. (2) Coli(M):
the i-th column of M . (3) Dk := {1, 2, · · · , k} , k ≥
2. (4) δin: the i-th column of the identity matrix In. (5)
∆n :=
{
δin|i = 1, · · · , n
}
. (6) A matrix L ∈ Mm×n is
called a logical matrix if the columns of L are of the form
of δkm. Denote by Lm×n the set of m × n logical matrices.
(7) If L ∈ Ln×r, by definition it can be expressed as
L = [δi1n , δ
i2
n , · · · , δ
ir
n ]. For the sake of compactness, it is
briefly denoted as L = δn[i1, i2, · · · , ir].
The semi-tensor product of matrices is defined as follows:
Definition 6.1: Let M ∈ Mm×n, N ∈ Mp×q , and t =
lcm{n, p} be the least common multiple of n and p. The semi-
tensor product (STP) of M and N is defined as
M ⋉N :=
(
M ⊗ It/n
) (
N ⊗ It/p
)
∈ Mmt/n×qt/p, (27)
where ⊗ is the Kronecker product.
In the following, we consider how to express a logical
function into an algebraic form.
Let xi ∈ Dki , i = 1, · · · , n be logical variables and f :∏n
i=1Dki → Dk0 be a (multi-valued) logical function. For
Dk, we identify s ∈ Dk with δ
s
k ∈ ∆k. Then we can express
f(x) into a matrix form.
Theorem 6.2: [3] Let xi ∈ Dki , i = 1, · · · , n be logical
variables and f :
∏n
i=1Dki → Dk0 be a (multi-valued) logical
function. When xi are expressed into vector form, there exists
a unique logical matrix Mf ∈ Lk0×k, where k =
∏n
i=1 ki,
such that
f(x1, · · · , xn) = Mf ⋉
n
i=1 xi. (28)
Mf is called the structure matrix of f .
Next, assume a logical dynamic system
xi(t+ 1) = fi(x1, · · · , xn), i = 1, · · · , n. (29)
Using Theorem 6.2, (29) can be expressed into matrix forms
as
xi(t+ 1) =Mix(t), i = 1, · · · , n, (30)
where Mi is the structure matrix of fi, i = 1, · · · , n, and
x(t) = ⋉ni=1xi(t). Multiplying both sides of (30) together, we
can have more compact form for (29).
Theorem 6.3: [3] Consider system (29). Using (30), it can
be expressed into its algebraic state space (ASS) form as
x(t+ 1) = Lx(t), (31)
where L = M1 ∗ M2 ∗ · · · ∗ Mn, and ∗ is the Khatri-Rao
product.
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